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Adnominal Conditionals and Their Licensing Conditions * 
Takashi Shizawa 
1. Introduction 
1.1. Overview of Typical Conditionals 
Conditional constructions are roughly defined as complex sentences composed of 
a main clause (sometimes called q, or the apodosis) and a subordinate clause (p, or the 
protasis) (cf. Dancygier (1998: 1 ». In addition, it is generally acknowledged that there 
is interdependency between the protasis and apodosis such as cause-effect relation or 
premise-conclusion relation. Typical conditional constructions are exemplified below: 
(1) a. If Mary goes, John will go. 
b. If she's divorced, (then) she's been married. 
c. If you went to the party, did you see him? 
(Sweetser (1990: 115» 
(Sweetser (1990: 116» 
(Sweetser (1990: 120» 
The example in (1 a) is referred to by Sweetser (1990) as a content-domain conditional. 
The relation linking p and q in content-domain conditionals is causality. In (1 a), the 
event described in the protasis, i.e. Mary goes, causes the event in the apodosis, i.e. John 
will go. Sentence (l b) is an epistemic-domain conditional in Sweetser's terminology. 
In epistemic-domain conditionals, the relation linking p and q is that of premise-
conclusion. Specifically, the speaker in (1 b) has concluded that she has been married 
from the premise that she is divorced. Sentence ( 1 c) is a speech-act domain 
conditional as Sweetser calls it. In speech-act domain conditionals, causality holds at 
the speech-act level: protases express conditions which render speech acts in apodoses 
felicitous. In (1 c), the question did you see him would be a felicitous question under 
the condition that the hearer has been to the party. 
In spite of the difference in their interpretations, all these conditionals have one 
feature in common: if-clauses usually serve as subordinate clauses adjoined to the 
n1ain clauses, describing sufficient conditions for the fulfillment of surface apodoses or 
implicit ones. I 
• This article is a slightly revised version of Shizawa (2010). 1 wish to express my deepest 
gratitude to the following people for helpful comments on an earlier version of this article: Yukio Hirose, 
Nobuhiro Kaga, Masaharu Shimada, Naoaki Wada, Masao Okazaki, and Masaru Kanetani. My thanks 
also go to Seizi Iwata and Takeo Kurafuji for their infonnative comments on an oral presentation of this 
work given at the 27th National Conference of the English Linguistic Society of Japan, held at Osaka 
University on November 14-15, 2009. I am also grateful to Kevin Moore for kindly acting as an 
infonnant. Finally, I am indebted to Shun Kudo, Shiro Takeuchi, Masaki Yasuhara, and Shotaro 
Namiki for their informative comments. Needless to say, remaining errors are of my own. 
1 The term implicit apodoses refers to the unexpressed parts of main clauses in epistemic and 
speech-act conditionals such as I conclude and I tell/ask you. 
Tsukuba English Studies (2011) vo1.29, 211-230 
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1.2. If-Clauses Modifying Nominal Expressions 
So far we have observed some typical conditional constructions and seen that the 
{[clauses in those examples serve as subordinate clauses modifying their main clauses. 
However, we sometimes find if-clauses serving, like relative clauses, as modifiers to 
noun phrases (NPs). Observe the following examples: 
(2) a. No one at school knew of her birthday. Certainly, she trusted, none of the 
pupils did, although she sensed a slight reddening under her high 
cheekbones as just for a few seconds she contemplated her embarrassment 
if one of her classes broke out into "Happy Birthday, Mrs Stevens!" 
(Declerck and Reed (2001:269), with slight modifications) 
b. Harry saw, in his mind's eye, the expression on Hermione:S' face if she ever 
heard about this abuse of house-elves, and decided never to mention it to 
her. 
(J.K. Rowling. Harry Potter and the Half-Blood Prince [italics are mine]) 
In these examples, the if-clauses do not condition the realization of the events described 
in the main clauses. In (2a), the condition described in the if-clause does not serve as a 
condition of her contemplation. Rather, it conditions her embarrassment. Likewise, 
the if':'clause in (2b) does not describe a sufficient condition for the realization of the 
event of Harry's imagination; rather, it conditions the facial expression which Hermione 
would show. That is, we should interpret sentence (2b) as "Harry imagined what 
expression Hermione would show if she ever heard about this abuse of house-elves." 
The main concern of this article is with conditionals of this sort, which we call 
adnominal conditionals (hereafter, ACs) following Lasersohn (1996). Specifically, I 
reveal the semantic and pragmatic properties of ACs and propose their licensing 
conditions. 
The organization of this article is as follows. Section 2 takes up Lasersohn 
(1996) as the only previous study that has seriously investigated ACs, at least to some 
extent. Section 3 points out a number of problems with Lasersohn's formulation. 
Section 4 reveals the semantic and pragmatic properties of ACs that have been 
overlooked so far, and proposes two licensing conditions for ACs. Section 5 makes 
some concluding remarks and mentions related issues. 
2. The Only Previous Study: Lasersohn (1996) 
In this section, we review Lasersohn (1996). As Athanasiadou (1997) states in the 
introductory chapter of the volume On Conditionals Again, conditionals and related 
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phenomena have been one of the most intriguing issues in the field of linguistics, as well 
as philosophy and psychology. However, little attention has been paid to adnominal 
conditionals. For example, standard reference books such as Quirk et al. (1985) and 
Huddleston and Pullum (2002) do not refer to ACs. Declerck and Reed (2001) deal with 
three eXaIl1ples of ACs including (2a), but they do not analyze them in detail? Bhatt aI1d 
Pancheva (2006) briefly refer to ACs, but they only review Lasersohn's analysis. It goes 
without saying that there is no mention of ACs in dictionaries such as OED or Webster s. 
Therefore, to the best of my knowledge, Lasersohn (1996) is the only study that deals with 
ACs seriously.3 
2.1. Lasersohn s Analysis 
Lasersohn (1996) presents three possible analyses of ACs as working drafts. 
Although I admit that his working drafts per se are not directly relevant to the analysis of 
mine to be presented below, they are worth reviewing for a better understanding of the 
semantics ofACs. 
2.1.1. Possibility 1: Concealed Question Analysis 
The first possible analysis Lasersohn (1996) offers treats nominal expressions 
modified by ACs as concealed questions. Observe the following examples: 
(3) a. We all know the consequences if we fail. 
b. We all know what the consequences will be if we fail. 
(Lasersohn (1996: 156)) 
In (3b), the if-clause is realized as an ordinary or sentence-modifYing conditional. It 
serves as a subordinate clause modifYing the antecedent clause what the consequences will 
be. Apparently, the logical meaning of sentence (3a) and that of sentence (3b) are almost 
equivalent. In addition, analyzing NPs containing ACs as concealed questions enables us 
to treat sentence-modifYing conditionals and ACs in a unified maImer. Thus it seems 
plausible and attractive to assume that NPs with ACs are rewritten at logical form as 
concealed questions. 
However, Lasersohn rejects this analysis because not all nominal expressions 
modified by ACs appear as complements of verbs that take interrogative complements, as 
shown below: 
2 They call ACs Nominal-Q Conditionals without referring to Lasersohn (1996). 
3 Fukuchi (1997) also deals with ACs and analyzes them in terms of selectional restriction without 
referring to Lasersohn (1996). I do not examine his analysis in this article, because he treats ACs as 
concealed questions, which, as will be seen below, is r~jected by Lasersohn. 
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(4) The outcome if John gets his way is sure to be unpleasant for the rest of us. 
(Lasersohn (1996: 155)) 
In (4), the NP the outcome if John gets his way occurs in the subject position of the 
sentence, but not as a complement clause to a verb such as know, which could take an 
interrogative complement. Thus the concealed question analysis does not seem to be 
adequate. 
2.1.2. Possibility 2: Analyzing ACs as Complements to Relational Nouns 
The second approach that Lasersohn proposes is to treat nominal expressions 
modified by ACs as relational nouns and ACs as their complements. Observe the 
following examples: 
(5) a. the consequences if we fail 
b. the consequences of our failure 
(Lasersohn (1996: 157)) 
The of phrase in (5b) is the complelnent to the relational noun consequences. Ifwe deal 
with ACs as complements to the NPs modified by them, we can easily grasp a 
synonymous relation between (Sa) and (5b), while we can no longer treat ACs and 
sentence-modifYing conditionals in a unified manner. 
Unfortunately, although this idea has plausibility for some examples such as (Sa), it 
is implausible for others. Let us consider the following example: 
(6) The price if you pay now is predictable; the price if you wait a year is not. 
(Lasersohn (1996: 155)) 
According to Lasersohn (1996: 157), the if-c1ause in (6) does not describe a service for 
which the price is imposed, or any other sort of event which might plausibly be a tenn of 
the price relation. So unlike the pair in (5), the expressions in (7) are not semantically 
equivalent: 
(7) a. the price if you pay now 
b. the price for paying now 
The meaning of (7a) can be represented roughly as "the price that will be detennined or 
required if you pay now," while that of (7b) can be read as "the price imposed for your 
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immediate payment." 
Furthennore, Lasersohn points out that relational nouns may appear with both overt 
complements and ACs, as shown below: 
(8) the consequences of our failure if John is in charge (Lasersohn (1996:157)) 
This example indicates that ACs should be treated not as complements but as adjuncts.4 
Therefore, it is not plausible to regard ACs as clausal complements to relational nouns. 
2.1.3. Possibility 3: Analyzing ACs as Free Relatives 
Lasersohn takes another approach wherein the nonlinal modified by ACs could be 
treated as concealed free relatives: 
(9) a. the consequences if we fail 
b. what(ever) the consequences would be if we fail 
(Lasersohn (1996: 159)) 
In this approach, we might analyze NPs containing ACs as being structured at the level of 
logical fonn. Specifically, we would assign the NP in (9a) a logical-form representation 
essentially like the free relative in (9b). 
As with the first approach (i.e. concealed question analysis), the advantage of the 
third approach is to be able to treat ACs and sentence-modifYing conditionals in a unified 
nlanner. However, it also has disadvantages like the following. According to 
Lasersohn, for one thing, the main cost in giving such an analysis is syntactic, not 
semantic: we must give superfluous rules for converting noun phrases containing ACs 
into free relative clauses in the mapping from surface syntactic representation to logical 
form - and we must try to justifY such rules in the context of S01ne well-developed 
syntactic theory (cf. Lasersohn (1996:159)). In addition, note that the free relative, i.e. 
whatever the consequences would be, replaces the NP the consequences. Lasersohn 
deems the structure of NP containing ACs as [Det [N if-clause]]. If the free-relative 
approach is valid, this means that the structure of NPs with ACs must be [[Det NJ 
if-clause], and not [Det [N if-clauseJ] (cf. Bhatt and Pancheva (2006:676)). In this way, 
the third approach is proved to be invalid. 
2.2. Lasersohn s Solution: The Semantics of Adnominal Conditionals 
From the above observations, Lasersohn (1996) concludes that the three attempts to 
4 However, note that the noun phrase in (8) is ambiguous in that the tfclause can possibly modifY 
both consequences and our failure, which Lasersohn seems to overlook. 
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analyze ACs are problematic both empirically and theoretically. Instead, he provides a 
semantic formulation to interpret [X if-clause] structures directly, as is shown below:5 
(10) [X if S] M,w = {x E U I for all those worlds w' closest to w such that there 
exists some yE [S] M,w', it holds that xE [X] M,w} 
(Lasersohn (1996: 162» 
Roughly, the formulation in (10) can be interpreted as "the meaning of the structure [X if 
S] is that in all possible worlds closest to the actual world where S is true, X is also true." 
If value S is assigned to variable X, the semantic fOffi1ulation is linguistically realized as a 
sentence-modifYing conditional, while if value N is assigned to X, the formulation is 
realized as an AC. By virtue of the semantic formulation in (10), as Lasersohn claims, 
we can grasp the semantic parallelism between sentence-modifying conditionals and ACs, 
and handle them in a unified manner. 
3. Problems with Lasersohn's Formulation 
In this section, I point out a few problems with Lasersohn (1996). As he claims, 
the semantic formulation given in (10) seems to be plausible and desirable as an abstract 
schema in that it enables us to capture the parallelisln between sentence-modifYing 
conditionals and adnominal ones without any special theoretical apparatus. However, it 
is insufficient in that it overlooks some facets of ACs on usage level. 
A few observations are in order. F or one thing, his fonnulation focuses on the 
co-occurrence of S and X (S or N), so that it overlooks basic semantic relationships seen in 
ordinary conditionals such as interdependency and causality between S and X. 
According to the formulation in (10), it seems to be sufficient for the referents of S and X 
to co-occur or coexist in possible worlds. This Ineans that any combination of S and N 
can be allowed in ACs, regardless of whether or not they can be related semantically in 
ten11S of interdependency and causality. This is not the case, however. Observe the 
following example: 
(11) * The malTImal if that's a mouse must be smaller than the maITImal if that's a 
dog. 
This eXaI11ple is composed of two ACs derived from epistemic-domain conditionals, i.e. If 
that s a mouse, it s a mammal aI1d If that s 'a dog, it s a mammal. The relationship 
between a mouse/dog and a mammal is inclusion: being a mouse/dog entails being a 
5 In (10), the abbreviations X, S, U, M and w stand for variable, sentence, a set of possible individuals 
(including events), model, and a set of possible world, respectively. 
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mammal (not vice versa). So the situation of being a mouse/dog and that of being a 
maminal can co-occur in any possible worlds. Lasersohn's formulation cannot account 
for the anomalousness of sentence (II ). This also means that Lasersohn takes no account 
of the ambiguity of conditional constructions pointed out by Sweetser (1990). If, as the 
exarnple in (11) shows, protases of epistemic conditionals carmot be used as ACs, it means 
that of the three types of conditional constructions, i.e. content, epistemic and speech-act 
domain conditionals, content-domain conditionals alone can be adnominalized.6 It seems 
that the adnominal use of if-clauses is possible if and only if causal relations are 
established between the if-clauses and nominal expressions modified by them.7 That is, 
ACs are specialized for expressing causal relations between events. 
Second, the exarnple shown below is also problematic for Lasersohn's formulation: 
(12) * Please let n1e know his arrival ifhe takes a taxi. 
The intended meaning of sentence (12) is "Please let me know when he will arrive if he 
takes a taxi." Although we can imagine a situation wherein the events his arrival and he 
takes a taxi co-occur, sentence (12) is not acceptable. In other words, although sentence 
(12) seems to be quite compatible with Lasersohn's formulation, it is not acceptable. To 
make sentence (12) acceptable without changing the intended meaning in a significant way, 
the NP the time must be added: 
(13) Please let me know the time of his arrival ifhe takes a taxi. 
Note that what the contrast between (12) and (13) means is neither that the phrase his 
arrival if he takes a taxi is never acceptable nor that the noun phrase his arrival is never 
compatible with the modification by ACs. In fact, the phrase at issue is fully acceptable 
in certain contexts, as illustrated by the following example: 
(14) His arrival ifhe takes a taxi may be later than (his arrival) ifhe takes a train. 
The sentence in (14) can be interpreted as "'The tilne of his arrival ifhe takes a taxi may be 
later than (the tin1e of his arrival) if he takes a train." Although the NP the time is not 
explicitly stated, we can infer that the speaker of sentence (14) is interested in when he will 
an'lYe. The difference in acceptability between (12) and (14) cannot be fully accounted 
6 The other type of conditionals, i.e. speech-act domain conditionals, cannot be used as ACs, either: 
the apodoses of speech-act conditionals have to express some speech acts such as an offer, promise or 
waming by definition, but nominal apodoses cannot express such speech acts. 
7 Declerck and Reed (2001 :370) take a similar view. 
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for by Lasersohn's formulation. These examples show that we should take not only 
semantics but also pragmatics into consideration to treat ACs properly. 
Furthennore, the following examples show that his attempt to treat ACs and 
standard conditionals in a unified manner ends up not being successful: 
(IS) a. * We {know/imagine} no consequence if we fail. 
b. We {don't knowlcan't unagine} what consequences will follow if we fail. 
c. We {knowlimagine} there will be no consequence if we fail. 
According to my informant, sentence (lSa) seems to be very odd and cannot be interpreted 
properly. Ifwe are to express the possible meaning of (1 Sa), we have to express iteither 
as (1Sb) or as (1Sc). Note here that the expressions cOlTesponding to the NP no 
consequence in (1Sa) are expressed in clausal forms in (1Sb) and (1Sc). Contrary to 
Lasersohn's view or expectation, this contrast indicates that ACs are not identical with 
sentence-modifYing conditionals: ACs inherit some semantic features of sentence-
modifying conditionals (e.g. causal relation at the content domain level) and are licensed 
by certain semantic and pragmatic factors. 
The above observations show that the fonnal treatment given by Lasersohn (1996) 
is inadequate. To treat ACs properly, we need not only semantic but also pragmatic 
viewpoints. In the next section, taking both semantic and pragmatic factors into account, 
I would like to present 1:\vo licensing conditions for ACs and show their validity using both 
attested and constructed exan1ples. 
4. Licensing Conditions for AdnonlinaI Conditionals 
4.1. Licensing Condition 1: Meanings ofNPs Modified by ACs 
To propose proper licensing conditions for ACs, we have to take into account the 
relationship between ACs and NPs modifIed by them. To put it more cOlTectly, we 
should consider what kind ofNPs go well with ACs. As the examples in (11)-(14) show, 
this is one of the facets of ACs that Lasersohn (1996) seems to overlook or neglect. For 
this purpose, let us observe the semantic characteristics of NPs modified by ACs by using 
exan1ples found in the British National Corpus (BNC). Note that in this research I 
restrict myself to the specific collocations, i.e. imagine X if Y and think of X if Y, and 
preclude exmnples containing NPs with prenominal modifiers (e.g. think of the usual 
responses if someone says . .. ) and postnominal ones (e.g. imagining the effects on her life 
if she had a daughter who was assaulted in ihis way) for convenience. Let us observe 
1:\vo of the nineteen exmnples found in the BNC (the italics are all mine): 
(16) a. Think of the outcry if that had been a nuclear accident. 
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b. In1agine the reaction if David Owen had appeared at Labour's 1989 
conference. 
It is worth noting that nouns such as outcry and reaction do not denote a spontaneous 
event: they need some causing events to occur. In fact, Cambridge Advanced Learner s 
Dictionary (CALD) defines the noun outcry as "a strong expression of anger and 
disapproval about something, made by a group of people or by the public," and gives the 
example The release from prison of two of the terrorists has provoked a public outCIY. 
As can be inferred fron1 the definition and example, the public outcry does not occur 
autonomously without a trigger. Likewise, CALD defines the noun reaction as 
"behaviour, a feeling or an action that is a direct result of something else," and gives the 
example J love to watch people s reactions when 1 say who J am. As the definition and 
example cleatly show, a reaction is usually construed as a result of something else. Now, 
let us observe the nouns found in the BNC examples:8 
(17) Nouns with ACs found in the BNC (19 examples in total) 
outcry (5), reaction (3), uproar (3), confusion (1), consequences (1), 
difficulties (1), furore (1), result (1), situation (1), scene (1), slnile (1) 
As the data in (17) shows, nouns compatible with ACs tend to be ones referring to events 
that are induced or brought about by something. In other words, most of the nouns in 
(17) can be construed as results or effects of something, i.e. resultant events. This fact is 
quite compatible with my view that ACs are specialized for expressing causal relations (i.e. 
cause-effect relations) between events/situations. 
However, a closer examination reveals that some of the nominal expressions 
modified by ACs are difficult to construe as resultant-event nouns. Let us observe the 
following examples: 
(18) a. The price if you pay now is predictable; the price if you wait a year is not. 
(= (6)) 
b. The location if it rains and the location if it doesn't rain are within five n1iles 
of each other. (Lasersohn (1996: 156)) 
In (18), the NPs the price and the location are difficult to interpret as events brought about 
by the fulfilhnent of the conditions in the if-c1auses, because both the price and location 
exist in advance of the fulfillment of the conditions. Rather, sentence (18a) means that 
8 The numbers in the parentheses represent the number of examples found in the BNC. 
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the price will be detennined in accordance with the hearer's decision as to whether s/he 
pays now or not. Likewise, sentence (18b) implies that the location will be decided or 
chosen according to the weather. In other words, the NPs in these examples contain 
unspecified variables (e.g. specific price and location) whose values are to be detennined 
by the fulfillment of the conditions in the if-clauses. 
On the basis of this observation, we can classifY nouns modified by ACs into two 
classes: resultant-event type (RE) and resultant-value type (RV) nouns, as in (19): 
(19) Two Classes of Nouns Compatible with ACs 
a. RE nouns: outcry, response, reaction, etc. 
b. RV nouns: location, price, time, etc. 
As discussed above, RE nouns can be construed as resultant events brought about by the 
fulfillment of the conditions in ACs. RV nouns, on the other hand, have variables whose 
values are to be determined by the fulfillment of the conditions described in ACs. 
So far, for convenience of discussion, we have recognized two types of nouns 
modified by ACs. However, a closer consideration reveals that RE nouns can be 
regarded as equivalent to RV nouns in a sense. To clarifY this point, let us consider the 
example in (16a), repeated here as (20): 
(20) Think of the outcry if that had been a nuclear accident. 
As stated above, the noun outC1Y is classified into RE nouns. Now consider the 
interpretation of sentence (20). The sentence can be interpreted as "Think of what outcry 
would have happened if that had been a nuclear accident." This interpretation suggests 
that the noun outcry in (20) implies some variable whose value is to be detennined. 
Likewise, the expression the responses if X can be interpreted as what responses will be 
given if X As clearly seen from these interpretations, RE nouns semantically contain 
variables represented by the word what.9 So, it is reasonable to deal with RE nouns as 
equivalent to RV nouns in that both types contain variables represented by wh-words. 
Taking this into consideration, we can get the following generalization: 
(21) The referent of a noun modified by an AC must be one that can be construed 
semantically as having a resultant value to be determined by the fulfillment of 
the condition described in the AC. 
9 This is not to say that nominal apodoses should be treated as concealed questions. As already seen, 
it is both theoretically and empirically problematic to treat them as concealed questions. Nevertheless, it is 
not deniable that ACs are related with wh-vvords. I leave this matter for future research. 
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Bearing the generalization in (21) in mind, let us return to the examples in (12)-(14), 
repeated here as (22a-c) respectively: 
(22) a. * Please let me know his arrival ifhe takes a taxi. 
b. Please let Ine know the time of his arrival ifhe takes a taxi. 
c. His arrival ifhe takes a taxi may be later than (his arrival) ifhe takes a train. 
The unacceptability of (22a) is attributed to the fact that the NP his arrival is difficult to 
construe as a resultant event brought about by the condition tf he takes a taxi: it lacks 
some semantic information to satisfy the generalization. In (22b), on the other hand, the 
lacking infonnation is supplied by the NP the time, because the noun time falls into RV 
nouns. So the NP the time of his arrival if he takes a t{L'Ci can be interpreted as "what 
time he will arrive ifhe takes a taxi." Sentence (22b) is semantically compatible with the 
generalization, and thus is impeccable. 
Sentence (22c) is the most interesting of the three examples, because the expression 
his arrival if he takes a taxi, which is unacceptable in (22a), is fully acceptable. We 
should consider what element or factor renders sentence (22c) ilnpeccable. Here let us 
focus on the adjective late. It goes without saying that the word late is closely related to 
the notion of time. To put it differently, the word late evokes time. That is, with the 
help of late, the expression his arrival can be construed as an RV noun, whose resultant 
value (i.e. time) is detennined by the fulfillment of the condition in the if-clause: the 
adjective late plays the SaIne role as time in (22b). In this case, the infonnation to satisfy 
the licensing condition is pragmatically supplied by the predicative adjective late, and thus 
the sentence is fully acceptable. 
From the above investigation, I revise the generalization in (21) and propose the 
following as a licensing condition for ACs: 
(23) The referent of a noun modified by an AC must be one that can be construed 
either semantically or pragmatically as having a resultant value to be 
determined by the fulfillment of the condition described in the AC. 
Here I mention the distinction between the semantic licensing (as in (22b)) and 
praglnatic licensing (as in (22c)). As discussed above, sentence (22a) is unacceptable 
because it lacks some semantic information to satisfy the licensing condition: the 
nominal expression his arrival can be construed neither as an RE noun nor as an RV noun. 
On the other hand, sentences (22b) and (22c) are fully acceptable with the help of other 
words such as time and late. Thus one might argue that their licensing mechanisms are 
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identical in that the expression his arrival if he takes a taxi is licensed by the semantic 
information of other words, i.e. both of the sentences are semantically licensed. However, 
note the difference between (22b) and (22c) as to what element the if-clauses modifY. In 
(22b), the element directly modified by the if-clause is time. That is, sentence (22b) is 
licensed because the noun time can be construed semantically as an RV noun whose 
resultant value is determined by the fulfillment of the condition described in the if-clause. 
In a word, it is the semantics of the modified noun time that influences the grammaticality. 
In (22c), on the other hand, the element modified by the if-clause is his arrival, which is 
judged unacceptable in (22a). From the word late, we can infer that the phrase his 
arrival metonymically refers to the time of his arrival. In this case, it is the pragmatic 
inference invited by the word late that licenses the expression his arrival if he takes a taxi. 
In other words, the word late pragn1atically supplies the unacceptable expression his 
arrival if he takes a taxi with information needed to be licensed. In this way, the 
expression his arrival gains its status as an RV noun. 
4.2. Licensing Condition 2: The Desirability Principle 
In the last subsection, I have proposed a first licensing condition for ACs on the 
basis of the observation using the BNC and examples of lny own. However, a closer 
investigation reveals that the condition alone is not enough to guarantee the acceptability 
ofACs: 
(24) * Imagine the fuss if I have a sound sleep everyday. 
This example seems. to satisfY the licensing condition I have proposed: the NP the fuss 
can be construed as a resultant event brought about by the fulfillment of the condition in 
the [(-clause. We can easily imagine such a situation; nevertheless, sentence (24) is 
judged as unacceptable or semantically odd. Behind the unacceptability of (24) is 
another pragmatic condition to be satisfied. What is relevant here is the Desirability 
Principle, proposed by Akatsuka (1998). 
4.2.1. (UNjDESlRABLE-LEADS-TO-(UN)DESlRABLE 
F or a better understanding of the Desirability Principle, let us briefly reVIew 
Akatsuka (1998). 
In everyday life, we perform various speech acts such as orders, prohibitions, 
warnings, threats and promises by using conditional constructions. We need to consider 
what principle works behind performing such speech acts. Let us observe the following 
example: 
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(25) If you eat my cookies, 1'11 whip you. (Akatsuka (1998:13)) 
According to Akatsuka (1998: 13), sentence (25) is ambiguous between a prohibition and a 
promise (or offer), as shown below: 
(26) a. Don't eat my cookies or I'll whip you. (prohibition reading) 
b. Eat my cookies and I'll whip you. (prOlnise/oifer reading) 
On the basis of our background knowledge, we usually interpret example (25) as a 
prohibition, as in (26a): no ordinary person likes to be beaten with a whip as a 
punis}l1nent. However, in a certain situation, sentence (25) can be interpreted as the 
speech act of promise or ofter. If the hearer is disposed to be whipped, and the speaker 
utters (25) with the full knowledge of the hearer's disposition, then such an interpretation 
as (26b) is quite natural. 
Akatsuka assumes that there is a pragmatic principle behind the ambiguity of the 
sentence in (25). The pragmatic principle is what she calls the Desirability Principle: 
(27) The Desirability Principle 
a. DESIRABLE-LEADS-TO-DESIRABLE 
b. UNDESIRABLE-LEADS-TO-UNDESlRABLE 
(Akatsuka (1998: 15)) 
As shown in (27), the Desirability Principle consists of two sub-principles. Briefly, the 
SUb-principle in (27a) means that if the realization of the proposition described in the 
protasis is desirable for the speaker, the realization of the proposition in the apodosis will 
also be desirable for him/her. As a result, the speech act intended in the conditional 
construction will be interpreted as desirable, too. The sub-principle in (27b), on the other 
hand, means that if the realization of the proposition described in the protasis is 
undesirable for the speaker, the realization of the proposition in the apodosis will also be 
undesirable for hiln/her. As a result, the speech act intended in the conditional 
construction as a whole will be interpreted as undesirable, too. 
The relationship between the values of Desirability and the interpretation of 
conditional constructions can be diagran1111atically represented as follows: 








(Akatsuka (1998:15), with slight modifications) 
In table (28), p represents the proposition in the protasis and q the proposition in apodosis. 
Akatsuka considers that the principle is true of natural language in general. Note here 
that the principle lacks relationships such as DESIRABLE-LEADS-TO-UNDESIRABLE 
or UNDESlRABLE-LEADS-TO-DESIRABLE. In this connection, Akatsuka argues 
that there is a contingency/dependency relationship between the protasis and apodosis of a 
conditional construction, which blocks such combinations. In fact, neither of them can 
be described in the fonn of conditional constructions at least in English, as shown below: 1o 
(29) a. * If you do what I want, I will do what you don't like. 
[DESIRABLE] [UNDESIRABLE] 
b. * If you do what I don't like, I will do what you want. 
[UNDESIRABLE] [DESIRABLE] 
(Akatsuka (1998:14), with slight Inodifications) 
With the Desirable Principle in mind, let us return to the example in (25), repeated 
here as (30) for convenience of reference: 
(30) If you eat my cookies, I'll whip you. 
As seen above, sentence (30) is ambiguous between a prohibition and a promise (or offer). 
When this sentence is interpreted as the prohibition Don't eat my cookies, the values of 
Desirability are assigned as follows: 




In (31), the proposition in the protasis you eat my cookies reflects the speaker's mental 
attitude UNDESIRABLE, and the proposition in the apodosis I'll whip you also reflects 
the his/her mental attitude UNDESIRABLE. Thus the speaker's mental attitllde reflected 
on the whole sentence is UNDESIRABLE. The hearer reads the attitude and properly 
interprets the sentence as the prohibition Don't eat my cookies. 
When this sentence is interpreted as the promise J'll whip you, the values of 
10 In English, sllch combinations must be expressed in even {(forms. 
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Desirability are assigned as follows: 




In contrast to (31), here the proposition in the protasis you eat my cookies reflects the 
speaker's mental attitude DESIRABLE, and the proposition in the apodosis I'll whip you 
also reflects hislher mental attitude DESIRABLE. Thus the speaker's mental attitude 
ref1ected on the whole sentence is DESIRABLE. The hearer reads the speaker's mental 
attitude and properly interprets the sentence as the promise I'll whip you (if you do me a 
favor). 
In this subsection, we have overviewed the Desirability Principle, which is 
pragmatically relevant to the interpretation of conditionals in general. In what follows, I 
will show that the Desirability Principle serves as another licensing condition for ACs. 
4.2.2. The Desirability Principle as a Licensing Condition for ACs 
As mentioned above, the Desirability Principle is a general principle in conditional 
constructions. If this is the case, ACs must follow it. Let us observe the example in 
(24), repeated here as (33), from the viewpoint of the Desirability Principle: 
(33) * Imagine the fuss if I have a sound sleep everyday. 
In tern1S of lexical meanings, the noun fuss tends to be interpreted as UNDESIRABLE. 
In fact, CALD defines it as "a show of annoyance, anxiety, dissatisfaction or excitement, 
usually one which is greater than the situation deserves." On the other hand, we usually 
interpret the proposition J have a sound sleep everyday as DESIRABLE. That is, the 
combination of the values of Desirability in (33) is DESIRABLE-LEADS-TO-
UNDESIRABLE. As mentioned above, this combination is not allowed in conditional 
constructions. To represent this combination, we have to use concessive constructions 
with even if. However, the conjunction even ifcannot be used as an ACs, as in (34): 
(34) * Imagine the fuss even if I have a sound sleep everyday. 
[UD] [D] 
In (34), the capitals D and UD are the abbreviations of DESIRABLE and UN-
DESIRABLE, respectively. As shown in (34), even if cannot be used as an adnominal 
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concessive clause. Furthennore, this seems to indicate that the concessive reading, which 
is possible in sentence-modifying if-clauses in certain contexts, is barred. From this 
observation, I assume that the values of Desirability assigned in nominal apodoses and 
adnominal protases should be consistent with each other. 
Note that the above observation and related discussion are concerned with lexical 
meanings, i.e. semantics. We have to take pragmatic factors into consideration. In fact, 
as Akatsuka (1998: 19) states, the Desirability Principle per se is a pragmatic notion, 
although it is closely related with semantics and syntax. It reflects the speaker's mental 
attitude, rather than lexical meanings of items. For example, consider the statement] will 
kill you. The default or lexical meaning conveyed by this statement is UNDESIRABLE: 
no ordinary person wants or wishes to kill someone. However, in a situation where the 
speaker could get some benefit by killing the hearer, the statement can be or should be 
interpreted as DESIRABLE. This means that the values of Desirability are more 
sensitive to contexts than to lexicallneanings. In fact, pragmatics is prior to semantics, at 
least as far as the Desirability Principle is concerned. 
If so, it is expected that sentence (33) may be accepted in some contexts wherein the 
nounjUss can be interpreted as DESIRABLE or the event] have a sound sleep everyday as 
UNDESIRABLE. This expectation is borne out, as shown below: 
(35) Of course I know it's important for me to sleep well, but I have a lot of parts 
to play in this plan! Imagine the fuss if I have a sound sleep everyday. 
[UD] [UD] 
The sentence in (3J) is fully acceptable in (35). As inferred from the first sentence, the 
speaker cannot sleep well now because of the business plan that he is engaged in. In this 
context, both the fuss and ] have a sound sleep everyday should be interpreted as 
UNDESIRABLE events. 
Let us observe another example for confirmation: 
(36) Imagine the awful consequences if we have a good time. I hope they will be 
[D] [D] 
in trouble! 
In tenns of lexical meanings, the first sentence in (36) is expected to be unacceptable: 
the phrase awful consequences is UNDESIRABLE, while the statement we have a good 
time is DESIRABLE. However, as can be inferred from the second sentence, the speaker 
wants some awful consequences. In this context, the expression awful consequences can 
easily be interpreted as DESIRABLE. 
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On the basis of the above observation, I propose a second licensing condition for 
ACs: 
(37) The Pragmatic Licensing Condition for ACs 
ACs must strictly follow the Desirability Principle: the val ues of 
Desirability in nominal apodoses and ACs must be consistent vvith each other. 
Condition (37) also means that ACs never allow concessive readings (i.e. interpreting an 
if-clause as an even ii·clause) in any contexts. Again, this shows that we should not treat 
ACs and sentence-modifying if-clauses in a unified manner. 
4.2.3. Possible Counterargument 
One might argue that the Desirability Principle as a licensing condition for ACs is 
not reasonable in sentences describing objective events such as (38).1 L 12 For example, 
lexical items such as movie seem to be neutral as to desirability: 
(38) John Travolta? Good thing he turned down the role of Forrest Gump ... Tom 
I-lanks \vas perfect for it, he was the one! I couldn't imagine the movie if it 
was John Travolta! 
However, recall that the principle is pragmatic in nature: it renects the speaker's mental 
attitude, rather than lexical meanings of items, although there are cases \vhere they accord 
with each other. As discussed above, it is misunderstanding that lexical meanings 
directly reflect speakers' evaluations. In this example, for instance, the statement Tom 
Hanks was perfect for it, he was the one clearly indicates that the speaker gives positive 
evaluation, i.e. DESIRABLE, to the movie Forest Gump. Then, s/he thinks that if John 
Travolta had played the role given to Tom Hanks in the movie, it would have been 
undesirable. That is, the combination of the values of Desirability given to the last 
sentence is UNDESIRABLE-UNDESIRABLE, as shown below: 
(39) I couldn't imagine the movie if it was John Travolta! 
[UD] [UD] 
In this vvay, the speakers' evaluation as to desirability is reflected on ACs. It should be 
II By the word objective, I mean that the speaker is not involved with the event described in a 
sentence. 




noted that the Desirability Principle is a pragmatic principle, and thus is dependent on the 
context, i.e. in what situation an utterance is given. 
4.3. Summary 
In this section, I have proposed two licensing conditions for ACs, as shown below: 
(40) License Conditions for Adnominal Conditionals 
a. The referent of a noun modified by an AC must be one that can be construed 
either semantically or pragmatically as having a resultant value to be 
determined by the fulfillment of the condition described in the AC. (= (23)) 
b. ACs must strictly follow the Desirability Principle: the values of 
Desirability in nominal apodoses and ACs must be consistent with each other. 
(= (37)) 
Condition (40a) is a special condition imposed on ACs, while condition (40b) is based on a 
general pragmatic condition for conditional constructions. As argued above, ACs are 
properly licensed by the interaction of the two conditions. 
5. Concluding Remarks and Related Issues 
5.1. Concluding Remarks 
In this article, I have been concerned with adnominal conditionals (ACs) and 
proposed their licensing conditions. I have made the following points. First, ACs are 
extended from event level or content-domain level conditionals. That is, nominal 
expressions modified by ACs are construed as results brought about by the fulfillment of 
the conditions described in ACs. Second, if such a construal is impossible or difficult by 
semantic infonnation alone, pragmatic information may fill in gaps. Furthermore, the 
Desirability Principle, which holds in conditional constructions in general, also affects the 
acceptability of ACs, which means that the objectivist view proposed by Lasersohn (1996) 
is inadequate. 
5.2. Related Issues 
Before concluding this article, I would like to Inention some related issues. 
Although this at1icle has proposed semantic/pragmatic licensing conditions for ACs from 
the viewpoint of causality (( 40a), in particular), the conjunction because cannot be used 
adnominally: 
(41) a. We know the consequences if we fail. 
b. * We know the consequences because we fail. 
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As is widely acknowledged, because is a representative marker of causality in English. 
Although the notion of causality is common be1:\;yeen if and because, the former alone can 
be used as a marker introducing adnominal clauses, as shown in (41). That is, the 
unacceptability of (41 b) implies that the licensing condition in (40a), which is based on the 
notion of causality, is a special condition imposed on ACs, and not a general condition for 
adnominalization of adverbial clauses. In other words, the notion of causality is not 
relevant to adnominalization per se. Admittedly, we are not in a position to give a clear 
solution to the problem. However, the difference beween if and because at issue can 
possibly be attributed to the difference of their basic selnantic characteristics: hypothetical 
vs. factual. The conjunction if is hypothetical in that it evokes hypothetical situations. 
Behind the hypothetical situation that if evokes or builds is another situation evoked by 
if-not. This contrastive nature of !f seeins to be quite compatible with the function of 
adnominal clauses, i.e. restriction. This is what lacks in because, which is based on 
factual causality and does not evoke another hypothetical situation. 
However, this does not mean that if is the only adverbial conjunction that can be 
used as a marker of adnominal clauses. Other factual conjunctions introducing adverbial 
clauses such as when, before and after may introduce adnominal clauses. Let us observe 
the following examples (the italics are all mine): 
(42) ... he remembered Ron's expression when he had seen her kissing Dean, ... 
(J.K. Rowling, Harry Potter and the Half-Blood Prince) 
(43) Just take it as a challenge, because some of them are very hard to get, but the 
satisfaction after you complete the stage is a very valuable prize. 
(http://www.gamefaqs.com/console/snes/file/563219110476) 
(44) the interval before she spoke was appreciable, and that was against the rules 
of the game. (Haan (1989:]06)) 
The adnominal use of when, before and after is not rare, although I cannot assert that it is 
established or conventionalized. Note that all these conjunctions introduce time 
adverbial clauses. It is often pointed out that the notion of time is contiguous with that of 
condition, and that they overlap each other and constitute a moderate continuwn (cf. 
Tsubomoto (1998), Nishimitsu (2006), among others). In fact, Declerck and Reed 
(2001 :28-35) discuss time adverbial clauses with conditional connotations introduced by 
when, before and after. A key concept shared by them is case-specification: all these 
conjunctions, including if, can specify cases where some events described in main clauses 
occur. Although it is expected that the adnominalization of adverbial clauses can be 
treated in a unified manner in tenns of case-specification, it would be premature to go into 
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them in detail here. It suffices here to present a future direction. 
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